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Abstract
In october 2008 a mysterious article was published under the pseudonym Satoshi 
nakamoto: “bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system”. bitcoin’s entry into operation 
some months later in early 2009 barely caused a ripple. Since then, the scheme has 
accumulated more than half a million blocks in its blockchain and they include more than 
300 million transactions. In view of the media impact of bitcoin, it is worth explaining in 
some detail how bitcoin works and what its limitations are. This article reviews the aims 
and basic functioning of bitcoin, analyses its strengths and weaknesses, and discusses its 
usefulness as an exchange mechanism.
Keywords: blockchain, hash function, bitcoin, cryptoassets, cryptography, innovation, 
technology.
JEL classification: o31, o33.
Resumen
en octubre de 2008 se publicó un misterioso artículo bajo el seudónimo de Satoshi 
nakamoto: «bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system». Meses después, a principios 
de 2009, bitcoin comenzó a operar sin generar apenas atención. desde entonces hasta 
hoy, el esquema ha acumulado más de medio millón de eslabones en su cadena de bloques 
o blockchain, que recogen más de 300 millones de operaciones. Teniendo en cuenta la 
repercusión mediática que ha generado Bitcoin, parece conveniente explicar con un cierto 
grado de detalle su funcionamiento y limitaciones. este documento revisa los objetivos que 
se perseguían con la creación de bitcoin y su funcionamiento básico, analiza sus ventajas 
e inconvenientes, y discute su utilidad como mecanismo de intercambio.
Palabras clave: blockchain, función hash, bitcoin, criptoactivos, criptografía, innovación, 
tecnología.
Códigos JEL: o31, o33.
bAnco de eSpAñA 7 Documento ocasional n.º 1901
CONTENTS
Abstract  5
Resumen  6
1 Introduction 8
2  Why does Bitcoin function as it does? 9
  box 1 basic concepts: asymmetric cryptography and hash functions 9
  2.1 objective of bitcoin 11
  2.2  constructing bitcoin 12
  2.3 How does the ledger remain unique? blockchain forks 16
  2.4  When can we consider that a transaction is final? 17
  2.5  How can bitcoin be protected against fraud? 18
  2.6 Where are bitcoin balances stored? 19
  2.7  Some figures 20
3  Is Bitcoin a good payment system? 22
  3.1  Security 22
  3.2  Speed 23
  3.3  cost 24
  3.4 Anonymity and privacy 25
  3.5  capacity 26
  3.6  efficiency and business model 27
  3.7 Governance 28
4 Conclusions 29
References 31
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1901
1 Introduction
bitcoin has attracted increasing interest in recent years and, moreover, the debate sparked 
by Bitcoin has ramified. Initially it branched into two areas of discussion. One was the role of 
bitcoins as an asset and the possibility that they might be an alternative to fiduciary money. The 
second was the analysis of the blockchain as an exchange mechanism and its potential use as a 
payment system or for the clearing and settlement of securities or other assets. Meanwhile, the 
market price of bitcoins has fluctuated sharply, from zero to nearly $20,000 per bitcoin. Currently 
(December 2018) its price is around $3,500 per bitcoin. As shown in Figure 1, the Bitcoin 
debate has become even more complicated. This paper focuses on the analysis of bitcoin as 
an exchange mechanism, specifically on its strengths and weaknesses as an alternative to 
traditional payment systems.
Bitcoin as an asset:
an alternative to money?
Bitcoin blockchain
as an exchange 
mechanism: an alternative 
to payment systems?
— Cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets
— ICOs
— Central bank digital currency (CBDC)
— DLT: distributed ledgers (public, permissioned, 
private...)
— Smart contracts
SOURCE: Devised by author.
COURSE OF THE DEBATE: FROM BITCOIN TO CRYPTO-ASSETS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY (DLT)
FIGURE 1
BASIC CONCEPTS: ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY AND HASH FUNCTIONS BOX 1 
This box explains some basic concepts of cryptography relating to 
the functioning of Bitcoin described in the paper. The explanations 
are intended to make Bitcoin more generally understood: they are 
not intended to be rigorous, but rather to give a basic knowledge 
of how Bitcoin works.
Cryptography or encryption can be defined as a procedure which 
uses an algorithm with a key (cryptographic key) and transforms a 
message such that it is incomprehensible for anyone who does 
not have the secret key (decryption key) of the algorithm.
In its classical form, cryptography uses the same key to encrypt 
and decrypt messages, which does not fully solve the security 
problem. The recipients of the message have to exchange bilaterally 
the cryptographic key, and so run the risk that a third party may 
intercept that key and gain access to the information they are 
exchanging. Moreover, the number of bilateral key exchanges 
becomes unmanageable if the number of participants exchanging 
information is high (see Figure A).
Nowadays a more refined version called asymmetric or double-key 
cryptography is much used. Here two related keys are generated, one 
of which is kept secret (S) and the other is made public (P). These two 
keys are generated using specific programs which start from a random 
number and it is practically impossible to deduce S from a knowledge 
of P and vice versa (provided the keys have been generated correctly). 
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2 Why does Bitcoin function as it does?
This paper describes the functioning of the bitcoin exchange mechanism in somewhat more 
detail than is usually given in similar summaries. Although it avoids excessive technical details, 
some basic cryptographic concepts (hash functions and asymmetric cryptography) should be 
mastered. These basic concepts are explained in box 1. Also, bitcoin is presented differently 
from usual. Instead of diving straight into a description of how the scheme works, we take an 
iterative approach in which we build from scratch a cryptocurrency model similar to bitcoin.1 This 
procedure is slower, but the resolution of problems as they appear will be useful for explaining 
why bitcoin functions as it does and not in some other way. 
1  Sections 2.1 and 2.2, which explain the iterative approach and the successive modifications to the proof-of-work 
protocol, are taken from nielsen (2013), with some changes. The main change is that bitcoin addresses are likened 
to account numbers rather than to currency references or serial numbers, which could cast doubt on their fungibility.
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BASIC CONCEPTS: ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY AND HASH FUNCTIONS (cont’d.) BOX 1
 
Asymmetric cryptography can be compared with a lock which has 
two keys: encryption (locking) by means of S can only be decrypted 
(unlocked) by means of P, and vice versa (see Figure B).
Asymmetric cryptography is usually combined with a certification 
authority which verifies the identity of a person when she generates and 
communicates her key pair. This person has to keep her private key 
secret, whereas the public key is readily accessible to all participants.
Asymmetric cryptography assures confidentiality in communications 
and allows the issuer of a message to be authenticated. 
Confidentiality: suppose a person (Alice) wants to send an encrypted 
message to someone (Bob). Alice encrypts the message using the 
public key of Bob, so only Bob can decrypt it with his private key. Note 
that, unlike in classical or symmetric cryptography, there is no need for 
Alice and Bob to previously exchange their cryptographic keys.
Authentication or electronic signature: suppose that Alice wants 
to prove that she wrote a message. To do this, she sends the 
message to another person and attaches a copy of it encrypted 
using her secret key. The recipient uses Alice’s public key to 
decrypt the encrypted message and compares it with the 
unencrypted information. If they are equal, it is clear that only Alice 
could have sent the message.
Another tool useful for understanding how Bitcoin works is the 
hash function. It is a cryptographic function (H) which, given an 
input x (any text or value of variable length), returns an output h 
(denoted “digest” or “hash”) of fixed length (H(x)=h). Hash 
functions have the following properties:
—  It is “trivial”, given an input x, to find its hash h.
—  It is “impossible”, given h, to find x (one-way function).
—  It is “impossible” to change x without changing h. Small 
changes in x return completely different outputs h.
—  It is “impossible” to find two x which return the same h.1
Hash functions have many uses: 
They can be used to increase security. A business may decide to 
store the hashes of its customers’ passwords, instead of the 
passwords themselves. Thus, when a user types her password x, the 
business calculates the h hash (a trivial process) and compares it 
with the stored hash. If they coincide, the user can proceed with her 
purchase. A hacker who steals the information stored by the 
business only get the hashes of the users’ passwords, which do not 
give him access to the passwords (x cannot be obtained from h).
They can be used to verify the integrity of information. To do this, 
the hash of a message before it is sent is compared with that 
generated at the destination. If any change has been made, the 
hashes will be different, and comparing two hashes is simple 
because their size is limited.
They can also be used as a summary or “digital fingerprint” of a 
very extensive input. 
They can also be used to construct proof-of-work, which are 
widely used in Bitcoin and which also have other applications, 
such as hindering denial-of-service attacks. Let us consider a 
1  “Trivial” means that very small amount of computing resources is required. 
“Impossible” is used to indicate that the computing power required to find a 
solution makes the process impracticable. For example, if we have a function 
H which gives a hash of 256 bits (such as SHA-256, used in bitcoin), the 
task of finding two x’s which give the same h requires an average of 2128 
attempts. A computer which calculates 10,000 hashes per second would 
take 1027 years to find them (Nayaranan et al., 2016).
Figure B
ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY
SOURCE: Devised by author.
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Key generation 
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BOX 1 BASIC CONCEPTS: ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY AND HASH FUNCTIONS (cont’d.)
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business with its website. Each customer that visits the website 
triggers a series of requests (access to the catalogue, orders, 
queries) which the business’s IT system has to deal with. An 
attacker could try to swamp the business’s website with requests 
from different IP addresses to the point of blocking its service. To 
make this more difficult, the business may propose the resolution 
of an artificial problem (a cryptographic puzzle) each time it 
receives an access request. This simple problem would not pose 
much difficulty to a genuine user, but resolving a large number of 
small problems would be difficult for an attacker launching a 
massive number of requests.
A possible proof-of-work would be: “given a random x, find a 
value n (usually called “nonce” or single-use random number) 
such that H(x+n) is a hash beginning with four zeros”. This calls 
for partially reversing a hash function (many H(x+n) expressions 
begin with four zeros). Finding the answer involves a trial and 
error process which uses up resources. The difficulty can be 
adjusted by changing the number of zeros (the more zeros, the 
greater the difficulty).
These basic concepts are sufficient to get a rough idea of how 
Bitcoin works.
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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2.1 Objective of Bitcoin
Before beginning to construct a scheme like Bitcoin from scratch, we first have to specify what our 
objective is. This is best done by consulting the paper by nakamoto (2008) which gave birth to the 
scheme. It begins by explaining that commerce on the internet relies on the intermediation of third 
parties (banks and other financial intermediaries) trusted by those participating in the transaction. 
According to Nakamoto, this model has some limitations. The first is that truly irreversible payments 
do not exist, since the intermediaries cannot avoid having to mediate between the parties in the 
event of disputes. The second problem, derived from the first, is that the intermediaries introduce 
a cost which makes small casual payments impractical. What is needed, according to nakamoto, 
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is “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any 
two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party”. 
Thus our task is to create an electronic payment system similar to cash which allows remote 
payments without the need for a financial institution. Nakamoto considers that this would enable 
truly irreversible payments and would reduce intermediation costs. 
2.2 Constructing Bitcoin
2.2.1 TeSTcoIn veRSIon 0
now that the objective is clear, to get an idea of what an initial, very simple cryptocurrency 
scheme (let’s call it testcoin) might be, we consider the sending of an internet message between 
the two parties. If Alice wishes to pay bob, she could simply send him the following message: 
“I, Alice, wish to pay bob 3 testcoins of the 20 that charlie sent me yesterday”.
obviously this model has serious problems. even assuming that the testcoins “sent” 
in the message have intrinsic value, there are many unresolved details: How does bob know 
whether Alice received 20 testcoins from a third party called charlie yesterday? How can he be 
sure that Alice has not sent similar messages to others to spend her testcoin balance several 
times over? How can Bob be sure that the content of the message has not been modified in 
transit and really reflects what Alice wanted to say? Finally, how can he be sure that Alice and 
not someone else sent him the message? 
2.2.2 TeSTcoIn veRSIon 1
Although it is not the main problem of version 0 of the scheme, the latter problem is the easiest to 
solve. If Alice uses public-key cryptography,2 she can sign the message with her private key and 
anybody could use Alice’s public key to check that only she could have written the message.3 
It is possible to go further: taking into account that the objective is to replicate a remote payment 
system with properties similar to those of cash, it is not really important to bob that Alice is 
actually Alice, but just that she has the money she is giving him. There is no need for Alice to 
really care who bob is. In view of this, testcoin balances could be associated with the public keys 
of Alice and bob, who do not need to exchange details on their identity. Thus, public keys would 
function as account numbers to which we can associate testcoin balances, such accounts not 
being associated with a specific identity.4 
After these modifications, the message which could be sent in the revised version of the 
scheme (version 1) would be similar to the following: 
“I, public key 008646BBFB7D, send 3 testcoins associated with said key to 
public key 3FD8C0A9C6FF”
2  See box 1 for a brief, non-technical explanation of asymmetric cryptography and public keys for ensuring message 
confidentiality and authentication.
3 In this case a trusted certification entity would be needed to verify the identity of Alice when she generates her keys.
4  Since the identify of participants does not have to be guaranteed when the keys are generated, a certification entity is 
not necessary; users can generate as many key pairs (“accounts”) as they wish using standard applications.
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Alice would sign the message using the private key associated with her public key so 
that Bob (or anyone else) can check that only the person whose public key is 008646BBFB7D 
could have written the message.
version 1 of the protocol looks better that the initial one. Alice and bob only reveal 
their public keys, and bob is sure that only the owner of the source account could have sent 
that message. However, the main problems besetting the initial version of the scheme persist: 
How can bob be sure that the issuer actually has in her account the testcoins she sends? 
even granting that she has them, how can bob be sure that the issuer is not sending a similar 
message to various people to spend the same testcoins several times over?
This latter problem, known as double spending, has traditionally been the greatest 
obstacle facing this type of decentralised electronic payment systems. Given that the asset 
exchanged is digital, there is nothing to prevent the issuer from making as many perfect copies 
of it as wished and using them to pay several recipients. Since the asset is easily replicated, it 
will lack value. The usual way to prevent double spending is to interpose a trusted third party 
who verifies the transactions. This intermediary would receive Alice’s message to Bob, verify that 
Alice’s account has a sufficient balance and debit her account and credit his account. If Alice 
sends the testcoins to various recipients, the intermediary would reject the transactions once the 
available balance was exhausted. In short, the usual solution to the double-spending problem is 
to introduce a bank, which is precisely what we want to avoid.
2.2.3 TeSTcoIn veRSIon 2
At this point nakamoto departed from traditional practice. Since a scheme in which the 
information is transmitted only between the two parties to a transaction does not work, and since 
the scheme wants to avoid a single intermediary in whom the parties have to trust, an alternative 
approach is needed. nakamoto’s solution is to retain the intermediary, but in a decentralised 
form. In other words, the scheme is designed so that all its members know all the transactions 
which have taken place and approve or reject them collectively. 
Thus, in version 2 of the scheme, all users have a full copy of the ledger containing all 
the transactions which have taken place. Alice could send to bob a message like that described 
in version 1 and bob would use the transaction history to check that: (i) Alice actually received 
in a previous transaction the testcoins she is sending him and that (ii) she has not spent them 
since. bob would add the new transaction to the ledger and share it with other network users 
so that they can update their copy.
However, this version of the scheme does not eliminate the possibility that Alice may try to 
double spend. Alice could send almost simultaneously two similar messages transferring the same 
testcoins to bob and to charlie. bob and charlie’s checks would show that both transactions are 
possible according to their copies of the ledger, they would add them to the ledger and would share 
their (different) versions of the ledger with other users. This source of inconsistency would make it 
practically impossible to maintain a unified version of the ledger among the scheme participants.
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2.2.4 TeSTcoIn veRSIon 3
To resolve this problem, we turn to version 3 of the protocol which introduces a change in the 
verification method. Instead of letting Bob or Charlie verify the transactions individually and 
disseminate potentially different versions of the ledger, the verification has to be done jointly 
by all users. Thus, when Alice sends the message to bob, he does not check it on his own, 
but rather publishes it on the network so that all users know that Alice (they only actually know 
her public key) wants to send some testcoins to bob (who is also only known by his public 
key). bob will invite all users to decide whether or not the transaction is correct and should be 
entered in the ledger. If Alice tries to pay bob and charlie almost simultaneously, the network 
users will realise that the two transactions are incompatible and will choose which one should 
be entered in the ledger and which should be rejected, ensuring at all times that the ledger 
remains unique. 
At first sight, this change looks promising, but it leaves some loose ends. The main 
one is agreement between participants: how can it be ensured that the scheme participants 
agree on which transactions may be entered in the ledger and which may not? perhaps 
the simplest way of resolving the problem is by vote, granting one vote to each network 
participant, with those transactions receiving a majority vote being entered in the shared 
ledger. This approach has a fundamental problem, namely that it is relatively easy to 
construct a large number of false identities and attempt to deceive the network. Alice could 
(at a moderate cost) flood the network with fictitious identities voting in favour of entering in 
the ledger the payments to both bob and charlie, deceiving both of them and accepting as 
valid an inconsistent ledger entry.
2.2.5 TeSTcoIn veRSIon 4
To resolve the problem of agreement between the network actors, we have to turn to version 4 of 
the scheme, which is where nakamoto makes his main, and probably least intuitive, innovation. 
To prevent a dishonest actor from deceiving the system with a large number of false identities, 
the process of approving transactions is made artificially difficult by what is known as a proof-
of-work. In this way, the transaction history accepted by the scheme participants will not be 
that receiving most votes (votes are easy to falsify), but that entailing most computational work. 
naturally, the participants have to be given an incentive to do this work, which uses up resources 
in the form of electricity and investment in hardware. Hence, verification will be remunerated by 
the assignment of recently created testcoins. We describe this procedure below in more detail.
When Alice wants to send her payment to bob, the message is published for all 
participants, along with other prospective transactions for entry in the ledger. The participants 
have access to the transaction history, so they can verify at virtually no computational cost 
whether this group of new transactions (called a “block” of transactions) is consistent with past 
ledger entries. That is to say, a check is made that the issuers received funds previously and have 
not spent them and that the transactions being verified in the block are compatible with each 
other and do not entail double spending. If the check is successful, that block of transactions 
can be added to the ledger. 
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before it is entered in the ledger, however, a proof-of-work must be carried out. 
Specifically, it is required that some user find a value x (nonce) such that the result of finding the 
hash5 of the information in the block (basically the list of transactions intended to be entered 
in the ledger plus the information in the header) and appending it to the nonce gives a value 
beginning with a certain number of zeros. 
H (information in the block, nonce) = value beginning with n zeros
Where:
Information in the block = header + list of transactions
As explained in Box 1, the result of the hash function is not predictable, so finding the 
nonce involves computational work which can only be resolved by brute force: testing values of 
x at random until one meeting the required condition is found. The number n of zeros required at 
the beginning can be adjusted to make the work more difficult or less difficult for users wishing 
to act as transaction verifiers.
Hence the verifiers, known as miners, compete to find a solution to this artificial 
problem. When a miner finds a solution, he publishes it so that all users can check that it is 
correct, which is very simple.6 once the validity of the transactions (existence of balance and 
absence of double spending) and the validity of the solution to the proof-of-work have been 
verified, the miners include the block in the ledger and continue working on the generation of 
new blocks.
An important matter yet to be resolved is the order of transactions. The ledger we 
are building is essentially a list of transactions ordered chronologically, to which blocks of 
transactions are gradually added. The chronological order of the blocks is essential in order 
to know whether or not a transaction can be carried out. Therefore, each new block entered 
in the ledger includes a reference to the immediately preceding block. This reference can be 
easily obtained by inserting in each block header the hash of the previous block. This creates a 
blockchain.7
Finally, miners must be given an incentive to spend their time and money (purchase 
of hardware, electricity cost) searching for solutions to the proof-of-work. In this connection, 
each miner adds to the transactions in the block on which the proof-of-work is under way an 
additional payment in which that miner assigns himself a certain amount of testcoins. These 
testcoins do not come from any previous transaction, but rather are created as a reward for the 
work done to obtain the required nonce. 
5 For an elementary description of hash functions, see Box 1.
6  It is very difficult to obtain a nonce x for which h (information in the block, x) has certain specific properties (e.g. beginning 
with n zeros). However, if x is known, it is very simple from a computational standpoint to find h (information in the block, 
x) and verify that the solution meets the required condition.
7  The first, or genesis, block of bitcoin contained simply the headline of the Times of 3 January 2009 (“The Times 03/
Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks”), along with the assignment of 50 bitcoins for the miner who 
generated the block (presumably nakamoto himself).
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This is all that is needed. With some simplifications, testcoin version 4 reflects the basic 
functioning of the Bitcoin protocol. Figure 2 summarises the basic aspects of the blockchain we 
have just created.
Figure 2 describes from a practical standpoint the public-domain software which anyone 
can download from the internet and run on their computer to carry out transactions or attempt 
to verify them as a miner. There is no limit on entries into or exits from the network, which is 
completely unrestricted. In view of the current complexity of the proof-of-work, however, miners 
tend to be specialised professionals with purpose-designed IT equipment. Users do not normally 
participate directly in bitcoin, but rather purchase their bitcoins in cryptocurrency exchanges 
(which sell cryptoassets for legal tender or act as intermediaries on a commission basis) and keep 
the keys of their bitcoins under custody in wallet applications or in specialised entities.
2.3 How does the ledger remain unique? Blockchain forks 
Perhaps the first question which arises now that we have explained the basic functioning of 
Bitcoin, is whether a multitude of unknown verifiers spread across the world, lacking a relationship 
of mutual trust, is capable of keeping a unified transaction ledger. In reality, the ledger may have 
temporary branches or forks, as explained below.
The bitcoin protocol determines that the longest linear blockchain (which is that 
containing most blocks and thus entailing a more demanding computational proof-of-work) 
TESTCOIN BLOCKCHAIN FIGURE 2
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SOURCE: Devised by author.
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constitutes the correct version of the transaction ledger. bitcoin is a global network with a 
multitude of nodes, so information exchange between nodes is not instantaneous. It could occur 
that virtually at the same time two validators find two valid solutions for the last block in the 
blockchain. each validator will announce his solution to the other nodes and, considering the 
latency of the network, it is likely that the two solutions will be propagated unequally, with some 
nodes accepting solution na and others nb.
The ledger will have forked into two blockchains of equal length, so the work of some 
miners will lengthen one blockchain and the work of the others will lengthen the other one. 
The near-simultaneous finding of solutions might be repeated, but in a short time some group 
of miners will generate a block for one of the two forks and communicate that solution to the 
whole network before a solution is found for the other fork. Let us suppose that the block na+1 
is generated earliest; in that case, all the verifiers, regardless of the fork on which they were 
working, would see that the blockchain entailing most work is that with n+1 blocks. They would 
all move to the last block of that blockchain and work to lengthen it by generating block na+2. In 
this way consensus and ledger uniqueness are automatically restored.
block nb is called an orphan block and the transactions in it which are not yet included 
in the blockchain8 return to “pending verification” status. 
2.4 When can we consider that a transaction is final?
A consequence of the modus operandi described in the preceding section is the difficulty in 
precisely determining when a bitcoin transaction is deemed to have been executed. Returning 
to Figure 3 analysed in the preceding section, let us imagine that a transaction was included 
in block nb but not in na or na+1. The beneficiary would believe that her transaction has been 
8  When blocks na and nb were generated, the validators who generated them chose the transactions they included in the 
block of pending transactions. It is thus possible that some (or all, or none) of the transactions that were included in 
block na are also contained in block nb. 
...
...
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included in the blockchain when actually it has only been included in a fork which has ceased 
to form part of the transaction mainstream. Once it is confirmed that block nb is an orphan, 
the transaction returns to “pending confirmation” status. In view of this, recipients are advised 
to wait until various blocks (at least five) are added to ensure that the transaction has been 
included in the mainstream of the blockchain. Thus, the irrevocability of the transaction is 
not obtained at a specific moment, but is rather a gradual process in which the certainty that 
it has occurred is not absolute or assured, but rather increases as blocks are added to the 
blockchain.
2.5 How can Bitcoin be protected against fraud?
It should be emphasised that the system, by its very construction, prevents the most direct fraud. 
For example, all transactions have to be signed using the private key associated with the issuer’s 
account, which means that a verifier cannot introduce a fraudulent payment and directly appropriate 
a balance owned by another person and transfer it to an account under that verifier’s control. 
Nor can a verifier include a fraudulent transaction in a block (sending a higher balance 
than that available) or two mutually incompatible transactions (e.g. derived from sending the 
same balance to two different people). Even though the verifier in question may manage to find 
a valid nonce to generate the block, no other node would recognise it as correct in view of the 
transaction history, which is public.
However, other types of fraud are possible, although the system design makes 
their likelihood of success practically negligible. Specifically, let us consider the possibility of 
deceiving the system without infringing any rule. Imagine that Alice sends 10 bitcoins to bob, 
the transaction is included in a block n and five additional blocks are added to the blockchain. 
When the blockchain reaches length n+5, according to the rule cited in the preceding section 
Bob declares that he is satisfied and confirms he has received payment. At that instant, Alice 
could devise an alternative block n (let us call it n’) in which her payment to bob is withdrawn 
and replaced by a payment to another public key controlled by Alice herself. If she were able to 
convince the other participants that node n’ is correct and n is not, she would have managed to 
defraud bob. In other words, Alice could attempt to alter the transaction history so as to undo a 
payment previously made by her and recover the funds.
To achieve that, Alice faces a number of difficulties. The first is to do the proof-of-work to 
find a nonce for block n’, since changing a transaction alters the information in the block and so the 
previous nonce ceases to be valid. If Alice found the solution, she would not be able to convince the 
other miners that her blockchain (with n blocks, including the last, forged, one) is the correct one, 
since there is a longer blockchain with n+5 blocks. This latter blockchain contains more proofs-of-
work, so the other miners accept it as correct. Alice could then try to insert block n’ in the correct 
blockchain of n+5 blocks, but this is not possible because the pointer of block n+1 points to block 
n, not to n’ (it is the hash of block n, not of block n’). Alice would have to change the pointer in block 
n+1 to the hash of n’, but changing the information in block n+1, which becomes (n+1)’ means 
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that the nonce of the block would cease to be valid, so the proof-of-work of block (n+1)’ would 
have to be done, and so on repeatedly. In short, Alice would have to remake the blockchain on 
her own behalf (no miner wants to devote resources to mining blocks of such a short blockchain) 
and manage to make it exceed the length of the correct blockchain for it to be accepted by other 
participants. Meanwhile the other miners will prefer to lengthen the correct blockchain and try to 
get the related rewards. If Alice does not have more computational power than the other miners 
altogether, it is practically certain that the attack will fail. not only would Alice not get near the length 
of the true blockchain, but she would progressively lose ground and nobody would recognise the 
transaction history proposed by her. She would be consuming resources in vain.
Instead of protecting the system from fraud through conventional security measures, 
bitcoin opts to permit such undesirable acts (which do not infringe any rule of the system), but to 
disincentivise them through its very design. If Alice has less computational power than the other 
miners altogether, it is more profitable for her to cooperate with the system, generating blocks 
and obtaining rewards, than to confront it. If Alice has more computational power than the other 
miners together, the system is actually a centralised system and would lose its appeal to users.
2.6 Where are bitcoin balances stored?
The bitcoin blockchain is essentially a chronological list of transactions. consequently the 
question arises of where users’ available balances are recorded. In order to understand the 
process which allows users to send and receive bitcoins and calculate the available balances, it 
is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the transactions recorded in the blockchain.
There are two types of transactions: the most common transactions have several 
inputs (balances received in previous transactions) and several outputs (balances sent to other 
recipients). The second type is the reward for miners which does not have inputs but does have 
an output in the form of bitcoins. This configuration allows users to send exact amounts, to pay 
fees, aggregate balances and receive change from a payment, as will be seen below.
Let’s assume that Alice is a network user and received a balance of 5 bitcoins in 
transaction t1, a balance of 3 bitcoins in transaction t2 and a balance of 1 bitcoin in transaction t3. 
SOURCE: Devised by author.
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These balances were the outputs of those transactions and are associated with three accounts 
(public keys) whose password (associated private key) is only known by Alice. So far Alice has 
not made any payment but now she would like to pay bob 2 bitcoins and charlie 4 bitcoins. 
Also, as an incentive for the processing of the transaction, she would like to include a fee of 0.1 
bitcoins for the miner who includes the transaction in a block.
In order to perform these transactions, Alice constructs transaction t4 where the amounts 
received in transactions t1 and t2 (5 and 3 bitcoins) are included as inputs and the payments to 
bob (2 bitcoins), to charlie (4 bitcoins) and the “change” from the payment (1.9 bitcoins) are 
included as outputs. Alice sends the change to a new public address which she controls. The 
remainder (0.1 bitcoin) is the fee of the miner that includes the transaction in the blockchain. 
charlie signs the transaction using the private keys associated with the source accounts (t1 and 
t2) and sends the outputs to the public keys of the recipients.
If Alice wanted to check her balance, she would have to aggregate the funds she has 
received as an output at some point in time which she has not used subsequently as an input 
of a transaction. After performing transaction t4, Alice’s final balance (2.9 bitcoins) is calculated 
by adding together the balances received in t3 (1 bitcoin) and t4 (1.9 bitcoins). In short, balances 
are not recorded in the bitcoin blockchain but they are constructed indirectly by aggregating 
the unspent balances received from the addresses (accounts) owned by a specific user. This 
procedure is called UTXo (unspent transaction output).
2.7 Some figures9
The bitcoin scheme is currently very small in size from a quantitative standpoint. As has 
already been indicated above, the creation of bitcoins is associated with the generation of 
blocks, with the result that the new bitcoins are granted to the verifier who finds the solution 
to the proof-of-work. This reward was initially 50 bitcoins per block, but under the protocol 
it is halved every 210,000 blocks. Taking into account that a block is created approximately 
every 10 minutes,10 under this rule the rate of block creation will decrease, with rewards being 
halved every four years. The reward is currently 12.5 bitcoins per block and approximately 
17.5 million bitcoins have already been issued. If the creation rule is not modified in future 
versions of the protocol, it is estimated that a total of 21 million bitcoins will be issued in a 
process which will last until 2140.
The price of bitcoins is very volatile. Following the tremendous rise in the latter half of 
2017 (to just below $20,000 per bitcoin), its price experienced sharp swings as it fell notably 
(see Chart 1). At the end of 2018, its price was around $3,500 per bitcoin and, consequently, 
the approximate total value of bitcoins issued was nearly $60 billion.
9  Figures obtained from www.blockchain.com (August 2018).
10  The average rate of block creation remains constant since the Bitcoin protocol automatically adjusts the difficulty of the 
proof-of-work so that a block is generated every 10 minutes on average, irrespective of verifiers’ computational power.
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The system processes approximately 250,000 transactions per day involving an 
estimated 150,000 bitcoins in total11 (around $600 million). These figures are insignificant if 
we compare them with traditional payment systems. by way of comparison, according to the 
“Memoria Anual sobre la Vigilancia de las Infraestructuras de los Mercados Financieros” (Banco 
de españa, 2018), the main Spanish retail payment system (the national electronic clearing 
System - Snce by its Spanish abbreviation) processed a daily average of around 7.2 million 
payments amounting to approximately €7  billion. The SNCE essentially provides services to 
individuals and non-financial corporations in a country with 46  million inhabitants, whereas 
bitcoin is a global scheme.
11  estimates constructed by deducting the amounts of change returned to issuers. This estimate includes purchases 
and sales of bitcoins in exchange for fiduciary currency and the purchase of goods and services as well as other 
transactions without a clear economic significance (e.g. the transfer of balances between addresses controlled by the 
same user).
SOURCE: https://www.blockchain.com.
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3 Is Bitcoin a good payment system?
Leaving aside the strictly monetary aspects of bitcoin (its use as a unit of account, a medium of 
exchange or a store of value), this section focuses on the functioning of the bitcoin blockchain as 
an alternative mechanism of exchange to traditional payment systems. Taking into account that 
bitcoin was created for e-commerce and making casual payments over the internet (nakamoto, 
2008), it seems reasonable to centre the analysis on retail payment transactions.
The criteria used to assess bitcoin as a retail payment system will be as follows: security, 
speed, cost, privacy, scalability, efficiency and business model sustainability over time.
3.1 Security
The advocates of bitcoin present its security as one of the scheme’s strengths. The transaction 
history is very reliable owing to the chaining of blocks using cryptographic techniques and it 
is practically impossible to alter this history, unless a majority of miners collude to forge the 
blockchain. The security of the balances recorded in the blockchain is ensured through a system 
of public and private keys. Apparently contradicting this high level of security, are frequent news 
items about bitcoin theft.
To analyse this aspect, the security of the core of the scheme (the bitcoin blockchain) 
needs to be separated from the security of the scheme as a whole, including wallet applications 
and cryptocurrency exchanges.
The backbone of bitcoin is the blockchain which is the public ledger containing the 
complete transaction history. considering that users’ balances are determined indirectly through 
the unspent amounts received, the whole scheme is based on trust in the fact that the history 
of these transactions is unique and does not permit alterations. The cryptographic chaining of 
blocks means that any alteration to the blockchain is immediately detectable.
does this mean that it is safe to use bitcoin? not necessarily, from the standpoint 
of final users. Even if the shared ledger is forgery-proof and the core of the system functions 
securely, users may experience theft (and, in fact, this happens frequently).12 Since users are not 
identified and the system is decentralised, ownership of bitcoins is demonstrated through the 
possession of the private key associated with the address at which those bitcoins are stored 
in the blockchain. If users lose the private key associated with an address, they actually lose 
the bitcoins (which would continue to be recorded in the blockchain, but users would not be 
able to use them, rendering them useless). If attackers steal the private key, they may perform 
a transaction by sending the bitcoins of another user to an account controlled by them. As the 
private key identifies the owner of the bitcoins, the transaction corresponding to the theft would 
12  According to some estimates, 14% of total bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies issued could have been stolen 
from their owners (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-18/hackers-have-walked-off-with-about-
14-of-big-digital-currencies).
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be indistinguishable from any other transaction and is compatible with the correct functioning 
of the blockchain.
In principle, users can operate directly in the scheme without intermediaries, so they could 
safeguard their private keys. However, this requires IT knowledge which is not within all users’ reach. 
In order to operate in the scheme, most final users trust digital wallet providers and cryptocurrency 
exchanges which safeguard their customers’ keys as part of their services. The most well-known 
bitcoin security incidents have taken place at this type of entities, which are located on the periphery 
of the scheme and act as an interface between the bitcoin network and end users. These 
entities are not usually regulated or supervised and users frequently have no-one to turn to if their 
accounts are looted or the entity safeguarding their balances goes bankrupt. one of the most famous 
cases took place in February 2014 when Mt. Gox – a major firm engaged in exchanging bitcoins 
for legal tender – went bankrupt in obscure circumstances, leaving many users without their funds.
Set against this, payment transactions through traditional systems and bank accounts 
are offered by supervised institutions which are highly experienced in information security. 
Furthermore, in case of fraud, regulations protect users who can claim the repayment of lost 
funds, in excess of certain amounts, from the financial institutions.
3.2 Speed
Speed is often mentioned as one of bitcoin’s fundamental qualities compared with traditional 
payments through financial intermediaries, since Bitcoin supposedly allows a transaction to be 
performed, from beginning to end, in 10 minutes on average. However, this speed is not always 
achieved and needs to be qualified for several reasons.
First, the speed of the process depends on the fee included in the transaction: a 
transaction which includes very low or no fees may remain in the queue for a long time or never 
be processed. Second, once the transaction has been incorporated into the bitcoin blockchain, 
recipients are recommended to wait until five blocks have been added to the chain to have some 
assurance that the funds are really in their possession. This additional delay (of approximately 
50 minutes on average) is recommended to rule out the possibility that the block in which the 
transaction has been included does not finally turn out to be an orphan block in a branch of the 
blockchain that does not ultimately form part of the transaction history.
In short, the bitcoin is not as fast as is sometimes indicated and the velocity of the 
process is relatively unpredictable. Although the swiftness of bitcoin may be a comparative 
advantage in certain payment market segments, such as international payments through 
correspondent banking, it is not striking compared with payments made nationally. At present, 
it is possible to make payments more quickly using a centralised architecture and traditional 
financial intermediaries. For example, card payments offer users a virtually immediate payment 
experience and it is possible to make transfers immediately between bank accounts in a question 
of seconds via a mobile or using internet banking.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1901
3.3 Cost
Initially, bitcoin advocates argued that the network allowed free transactions, although a small 
amount could be included voluntarily as a fee. These fees were a donation to the miner who 
managed to include the transaction in a block and, therefore, provided a small incentive for 
the miner in question to prioritise the processing of that transaction (miners can choose the 
transactions that they include in a block and, consequently, will choose those including the 
highest fees).
However, at present bitcoin transactions are subject to fees across the board. With 
the gradual rise in network traffic, the number of prospective transactions to be processed for 
inclusion in a block has increased significantly. Considering that the size of a block is limited (to 
1 Mb at present) and that the average rate of block production remains constant (approximately 
one block every 10 minutes), only transactions including fees are currently processed in a 
reasonable timeframe. Transactions with no fees remain in the queue indefinitely while sufficient 
numbers of transactions with fees for miners are entering the network. The minimum fee which 
ensures processing in a short lapse of time varies according to network traffic and logically tends 
to rise as traffic increases.
certain bitcoin digital wallets include set fees per transaction by default (although their 
level can be parameterised by users), whereas other more modern wallets set a fee dynamically 
based on network traffic.
Fees essentially hinge on the size of the transaction and not on the amount transferred. 
consequently, they tend to be relatively low for large payments and relatively high for 
micropayments (which is precisely the usage mentioned in the original report that led to the 
creation of the system). To give an idea of the order of magnitude, the minimum fees to ensure 
almost immediate processing of a normal size transaction were around $0.20 (December 2018) 
but climbed above $35 in December 2017 (coinciding with the tremendous appreciation of the 
bitcoin and an increase in the number of transactions in the network).
SOURCE: https://bitcoinfees.info/.
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In view of the gradual decrease in rewards for miners and the limit on memory set 
per block, any significant increase in network traffic will foreseeably cause fee spikes, unless 
substantial changes are made to the system’s design.
Also, unless users want to hold a balance in bitcoins indefinitely, the cost of converting 
bitcoins into fiat money needs to be added to the fees directly related to the processing of 
transactions. This cost, which is rarely mentioned, can be substantial.
3.4 Anonymity and privacy
The bitcoin scheme is presented as an anonymous payment system, despite being based 
on a public ledger. The personal information of participants in a transaction (names, account 
numbers, purpose of the payment) is normally transferred with the transaction message in 
traditional payment systems. All or part of this information is accessible to the issuer, the recipient 
and the intermediaries but not to unauthorised third parties. bitcoin radically changes this 
approach since all the information on the transactions is public (basically, the account numbers 
and amounts), but data which may link an issuer or a recipient to a specific account are not 
included. Anonymity is compatible with the public nature of the blockchain and is presented as 
an advantage of bitcoin, since the system can be used without supplying personal information 
that may be stolen.
Although the desire for anonymity may be for legitimate reasons,13 this characteristic 
of bitcoin has been criticised harshly by various authorities, especially considering that many 
intermediaries, which do not belong to the financial sphere, operate in this global network. As a 
result of the anonymity, it is difficult to apply measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing and, therefore, it is easy to use the system for transactions linked to unlawful activities. 
perhaps the best-known case is that of the “Silk Road”, a portal selling illegal substances and 
services hosted in the deep web which used precisely bitcoin as a means of payment. In october 
2013, the FBI dismantled this portal, seizing 26,000 bitcoins.14
However, the alleged anonymity of bitcoin is much lower than could be initially thought. 
Although the blockchain does not contain personal information, most users usually identify 
themselves to an intermediary15 (for example, to a cryptocurrency exchange) the first time that 
they access the network and change real money into bitcoins (and, subsequently, when they sell 
the bitcoins in exchange for other currencies). once users have bitcoins, they can use a limitless 
number of different accounts and split or combine their balances. Although transfers between 
the accounts of the same user are, in principle, indistinguishable from the transactions between 
13  For example, where users perform a transaction over the internet for the first time with a retailer with whom they do 
not have a relationship of trust, they could prefer to pay anonymously to avoid the retailer accessing their personal 
details (name, card number and expiry date) which may be used fraudulently later on if the retailer does not safekeep 
the information correctly.
14  Their value at that time was $3.5 million. It was estimated that transactions amounting to $1.2 billion could have taken 
place over the two and a half years that the portal was in operation [see Halaburda et al (2016)].
15  In the eU, for example, crypto asset exchanges are entities which must report to the authorities in order to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.
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different users, since the ledger is public it is possible to perform a detailed statistical analysis 
of the transactions. As a result of this analysis, combined with other sources of information (for 
example, the identification of users when they change currency or the relationship between an 
account and an identity in a blog), the accounts of the same user can be identified in many cases 
and linked to a specific identity.16
3.5 Capacity
Bitcoin’s current configuration puts a limit on the number of payments that can be processed 
by the scheme. If we take into account that the average rate of block production remains 
constant (10 minutes), that each block has a maximum size of 1Mb and a typical network 
payment represents approximately 250 bytes,17 a block could contain slightly more than 4,000 
transactions, which represents some 7 transactions per second (or around 600,000 daily 
transactions). Although these figures are significant, the orders of magnitude are lower than 
those which are customary in current retail systems, especially considering that bitcoin is a 
global network. As a reference, international card payment schemes are capable of processing 
thousands of transactions per second.
Actual network use was quite close to maximum capacity early in 2018 when 
transaction fees soared, coinciding with an increase in transactions and a rise in the price 
of bitcoin.
Modifications can be introduced to increase the capacity of the Bitcoin process, the 
most immediate of which would be to increase the maximum block size. However, it is not 
clear that a system based on a proof-of-work as demanding as that required by bitcoin can be 
changed to process a significantly larger volume of transactions.
16  Techniques and services also exist for “obscuring” the trail of funds and attempting to increase anonymity on the 
network (mixers).
17 Source: https://bitcoinfees.info/.
SOURCE: https://www.blockchain.com.
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3.6 Efficiency and business model
The functioning of bitcoin relies on the existence of miners who incur an expense (electricity 
and investment in hardware) to obtain income through transaction fees and the bitcoins which 
are created to reward miners who solve the cryptographic puzzle allowing blocks to be created. 
In principle, the difficulty of this cryptographic problem adapts automatically so that the rate 
of block creation is more or less constant. despite some sporadic declines, the complexity 
shows a rising trend which is evidence of competition and increasingly specialised miners. This 
specialisation fosters the creation of miners’ pools or clubs which combine their computational 
resources to increase their gains and reduce the variability in the rate at which they obtain 
rewards. The pooling of miners entails a process of centralisation: the four main miners’ pools 
account for more than 50% of the whole network’s computational power. This leads us to an 
oligopolistic business model in which the steep initial investment in specialised hardware could 
be an entry barrier to new actors. This model is far removed from the decentralisation which is 
usually attributed to bitcoin.
Aside from the number of miners, the complexity of the cryptographic validation process 
and the spending on resources which it entails, should be sufficient for calling into question the 
efficiency of a system which processes less than 300,000 daily transactions. As at August 2018 
some estimates indicated that the bitcoin scheme consumes 73.12 TWh, a similar amount of 
energy to that consumed by a country such as Austria.18 In a trust-based centralised system, a 
similar volume of transactions could be processed with a negligible consumption of resources 
compared with bitcoin.19
18  Source: https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption. This energy represents 0.33% of world consumption 
and would be enough to supply more than 6.7 million US households. The energy consumed in recording a single 
bitcoin transaction could supply electricity to approximately 31 US households for one day.
19  According to data from https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption, the energy consumed in the verification 
of one Bitcoin transaction would be sufficient to process more than half a million VISA card transactions.
SOURCE: https://www.blockchain.com.
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This tremendous cost is currently covered by fees and through the issuance of new 
coins when blocks are created. As the automatic rewards decrease, if the difficulty continues 
to increase,20 the fees will foreseeably rise to cover the scheme’s huge electricity cost, which 
could call its viability into question. In late 2018 it became apparent how bitcoin price volatility 
may prompt changes in the number of miners. In this case, a drop in the equivalent dollar value 
of bitcoins caused a fall in the returns obtained by miners and a consequent exodus by them, 
which in turn gave rise to a decline in block generation and a resulting adjustment in difficulty.
3.7 Governance
An essential aspect of bitcoin (which has been historically paid less attention than its technical 
characteristics) is governance. bitcoin has typically been presented as an automatic protocol 
with immutable rules. consequently, it is considered more trustworthy in certain circles than 
an authority such as a central bank, which can act discretionally by deciding the rate at which 
money is created and which transactions should be approved or rejected. However, the scheme 
is not immutable but evolves slowly provided that a critical mass of users agrees to implement 
changes. The maximum block size or the rule which determines that the rate of bitcoin creation 
will decline, could, for example, be changed at any time if enough users agreed to modify them. 
Significant change accepted by one part of the community of users but not by the other would 
lead the system to fork.21
The absence of a central authority, and the diversity and limited coordination of 
system actors make it difficult to reach agreements to gradually improve the system or react to 
unforeseen changes.
20  See “beyond the doomsday economics of “proof-of-work” in cryptocurrencies” for a detailed analysis of the long-term 
viability of bitcoin.
21  It was precisely the maximum block size (one of the most controversial aspects of bitcoin, since this maximum size 
directly affects system capacity) that triggered the forking of bitcoin into two mutually incompatible schemes (bitcoin 
and bitcoin cash) since August 2017. There are many other versions of bitcoin, although this name is usually reserved 
for the majority version.
SOURCE: www.blockchain.info. 
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4 Conclusions
Bitcoin is presented as an alternative to money and as a more efficient payment mechanism 
than traditional payment systems. In order to avoid the cost that intermediaries introduce into 
systems of exchange, bitcoin pursues the creation of an alternative payment mechanism with no 
intermediaries that can censure transactions (understood as the ability to stop or reverse them).
It is essential to underline the scheme’s ultimate objective since it influences its design, 
which is an almost natural response to the objective pursued [brown (2016)]: taking into account 
that we want to make remote payments using a digital asset, we need validators to prevent users 
double spending and to verify the consistency of the transaction history; since we do not want 
a central authority to control the flow of payments, we must set up an open network where any 
party can act as a validator and the transaction history is public; given that all the transactions 
are public, we need them to be anonymous to guarantee confidentiality; to avoid one or several 
validators attempting to falsify the transactions ledger, they are required to compete to perform 
proof-of-work; and to provide an incentive for covering the cost of the proof-of-work, we set 
up a reward in the form of new monetary units. The details of how bitcoin works can be found 
in section 2, but what is really important is to emphasize that the design is consistent with the 
objective pursued.
bitcoin allows an uncensored payment system to be set up, which is a very interesting 
innovation that resolves a complex problem, but this does not necessarily mean that the scheme 
is a good payment system. The numerous advocates of bitcoin argue that it represents an 
improvement to traditional payment transactions through the banking channel but these alleged 
advantages of bitcoin do not seem to be supported by the information currently available.
everything points to bitcoin having serious shortcomings if it is intended for use as a 
large-scale payments system. The main problem is that the absence of intermediaries and the 
consequent decentralisation of the system through a set of validators who do not trust one another, 
leads us to a resource-intensive validation process which makes the system less efficient. In other 
words, there is a clear trade-off between the resource consumption linked to the decentralised 
validation of transactions and trust: as a result of centralised systems with an intermediary trusted 
by the parties involved, much simpler and more economic systems can be designed.
It is no surprise that bitcoin has these problems. The scheme was not designed as an 
alternative to traditional payment systems but as a system “without a central authority with the 
power to authorise or reject transactions” (a system without the possibility of censorship). bitcoin 
is an imaginative and elegant solution to this problem, but the commonly used payment systems 
do not seek to resolve this problem. The purpose of traditional payment systems is to make it 
easy to send money between any two actors in the simplest way possible, at a low cost, swiftly 
and with a high degree of security. These objectives are very different and, consequently, it is not 
at all surprising that bitcoin does not function satisfactorily as a payment system (perhaps the 
opposite would be surprising).
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bitcoin detractors sometimes present it as a “solution in search of a problem”, whereas 
Bitcoin supporters believe it to be a solution to (what they believe are) the problems of fiduciary 
money and traditional payment systems. bitcoin actually seems to be the solution to a problem, 
but to a different problem to that normally mentioned by its supporters: the creation of a 
system without censorship. Taking into account that for most agents the existence of trusted 
intermediaries is not a problem, along with the costs and inefficiencies generated when an 
attempt is made to eliminate these intermediaries, it does not seem that bitcoin, as it currently 
stands, is going to have a significant impact for the financial sector as an alternative payment 
system to the traditional channels.
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